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GOVERNMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST DISCLOSURE
OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS*
PRIVATE parties seeking to subpoena records held by Government agen-
des are frequently met by a claim that the agency is privileged not to dis-
close documents in its possession. In sanctioning this claim courts have
rationalized their decisions in terms of the nature of the information con-
tained in the documents,' of the public or private character of the litigants,2
and of "public interest." 3 But no clear delineation of the scope of the
Government's privilege to withhold official information has been developed.
While in some instances the privilege is defined by statute,4 it consists
mainly in an amorphous concept developed by case law.6 Originally the
common law privilege protected only the indentity of informers 0 and
secrets affecting the national security.7 In a few cases, however, under
cover of the phrase "public interest" the privilege has been extended to
protect disclosure which would merely hamper "efficient public service." &
* Zimmerman v. Poindexter, 74 F.Supp. 933 (D. Haw. 1947).
1. United States v. Ebeling, 146 F2d 254 (2d Cir. 1944) (defendant denied permis-
son to inspect FBI reports following e.xamination by court and determination that their
importance to the Government outweighed possible advantage to the defendant) ; Jacoby
v. Delfiner, 183 Misc. 280, 51 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (in a private suit for scrvices
rendered, plaintiff denied access to Department of Justice records because of their "con-
fidential" nature) ; Shallow v. Mlarkert Mfg. Co., 175 M4isc. 613, 24 N.Y.S2d 823 (Sup. Ct.
1941) (in action by employees to recover overtime wages, information obtained by Wage
and Hour Division of the United States Department of Labor held privileged since em-
ployees could obtain the same information from the corporation).
2. See, e.g., Brewer v. Hassett, 2 F.R.D. 222 (*Mass. 1942) (in a suit against an
internal revenue collector, Government cannot invoke privilege against disclosure) ; United
States v. General Motors Corp., 2 F.R.D. 528 (N.D.II1. 1942) (in antitrust prosecution
Government compelled to submit to discovery in the same manner as a private plaintiff) ;
Fleming v. Bernardi, 1 F.R.D. 624 (N.D. Ohio 1941) (in a suit by the Government to
compel compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act, Government compelled to answer
interrogatories). See also 2 M1co's Fz nAL, Pmcrtcz 2641-2 (Ist ed. 1933).
3. Shallow v. Aarkert Mfg. Co., 175 Misc. 613,24 N.Y.S2d 823 (1941).
4. See 8 Wimoa, EVMEN CE 786 (3d ed. 1940); 165 A.L.R. 1302 (1946). A good
example of a state statute creating a privilege is a Texas provision barring the use in a
court of accident reports filed pursuant to state law. 19 Vm=:oz;'s Tax. Crv. STAT. art.
6687b, §42 (1948).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, 4 F.R.D. 103, 109 (1W.D.X.Y.
1944) (Apart from statutes "there may be certain ... files ... privileged and others
... not.") ; Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 4 F.R.D. 265, 269 (E.D.N.Y.
1943) (denying disclosure because "information of such employees and complainants is
of such a highly confidential character that it is privileged.....") See 3 NVi', noT- Evi-
DExc § 2378a (3d ed. 1940) ; O'Reilly, Discovery Against the United States, 21 1. C. L.
Rv. 1, 9 (1942); Pike and Fischer, Discovery Against Federal Adininistrati've Agceies,
56 H~nv. L. REv. 1125, 1129 (1943).
6. 8 WIGMoPa, EvinaicE § 2374 (3d ed. 1940) ; O'Reilly, sutra note 5, at 10-1.
7. 8 WIG=aoRn, EvnimxcE § 2378a (3d ed. 1940) ; O'Reilly, .sutra note 5, at 9-10.
8. Harwood v. McMurtry, 22 F.Supp. 572, 573 (W.D.Ky. 1938). See, also, Fowhes
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Whether the privilege be narrowly or broadly defined in terms of the
Government's needs,9 the difficulty with either definition is that it fails to
reflect the other major interest involved-the interest of the litigants, It
might well be, for example, that disclosure should be required as a condition
precedent to further prosecution in cases where a man's life is at stake,
regardless of inconvenience to a Government agency; conversely, where a
document would be merely additional evidence on a point otherwise well
established, a court in its discretion might sustain a claim of privilege based
merely on inconvenience.
The only doctrine which perhaps attempts to hinge the privilege on some
rough balancing of the two interests is the general rule that an asserted
privilege is to be granted in a suit'between private litigants,"° but denied
where thd Government is a party." The courts may feel that the detriment
to a party from non-disclosure in a private suit is not likely to be so sig-
nificant as the potential obstruction of governmental activities; in public
suits, on the other hand, the Government has had the documents available
in preparing its own case, and the courts may feel that the private adver-
sary's need to use them for rebuttal tilts the scales in favor of permitting
discovery. 12
It is apparent, however, that the "public-private" dichotomy fails to
strike a desirable balance in many cases. Not surprisingly, therefore, the
rule has occasionaly been disregarded: even in public suits the privilege has
v. Dravo Corp., 5 F.R.D. 51, 53 (E.D.Pa. 1945) ("When the public interest requires that
information be kept undisclosed, that interest ought not to be encroached upon. ....) ;
Shallow v. Markert Mfg. Co., 175 Misc. 613, 614, 24 N.Y.S.2d 823, 824 (Sup.Ct. 1941)
(".... [T]he disclosing of such information might be prejudicial to the government and to
the public interest.").
9. See Pike and Fischer, supra note 5, at 1136-8, for a discussion of factors weighing
for and against blanket Government immunity from disclosure. See, also, O'Reilly, .npra
note 5, at 13. 8 WIGmoRE, EVmENcE § 2378a (3d ed. 1940).
10. E.g., Harwood v. McMurtry, 22 F.Supp. 572 (W.D.Ky. 1938) ; Jacoby v. Delfiner,
183 Misc. 280, 51 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Shallow v. Markert Mfg. Co., 175 Misc.
613, 24 N.Y.S.2d 823 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
11. E.g., United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944) (criminal prosecu-
tion) ; United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944) (criminal prosecution);
Bowles v. Ackerman, 4 F.R.D. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (suit for injunction and treble dam-
ages for violation of price regulations) ; United States v. General Motors Corp., 2 F.R.D.
528 (N.D.Ill. 1942) (antitrust prosecution); Fleming v. Bernardi, 1 F.R.D. 624 (N.D.Ohio
1941) (suit for injunction under the Fair Labor Standards Act).
12. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 2 F.R.D. 528, 530 (N.D,Ill. 1942):
. T]he prohibition [against disclosure] relates to cases between private parties and
... unless against public policy in the particular case, a court should require disclosure
in an action in which the United States is a party. One of the purposes of the [federal]
rules is to enable a defendant to learn the particulars of a charge against him so that lie
may properly prepare for trial and it seems to me it would be an unjust and tyrannical
exercise of power for the Government to refuse to make the same sort of disclosure of its
case as would be required of an individual plaintiff."
A theory of waiver is often used to justify denial of the privilege in public suits,
When the Government elects to bring the suit, it takes the initiative in revealing informa-
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been successfully invoked where the need for secuirty is overriding; 13 con-
versely it has been denied in private litigation where there is no valid reason
for withholding the documents. 14
Whether or not the rule is followed, however, its existence can only ob-
scure and confuse the basic equities in the particular case. An example of
the attenuated reasoning which may result is the recent opinion in Zim-
merman- v. Poindexter.15 The plaintiff, suing the Ex-Governor of Hawaii for
false imprisonment under wartime martial law,"0 sought discovery from
an Army officer of "confidential investigative reports" of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation concerning his case. Although these reports had been
transferred from the Department of Justice to the War Department, the
Attorney General opposed the plaintiff's motion for a subpoena duces lecum,
claiming that such documents were legally privileged under his departmental
regulation expressly forbidding subordinates to disclose confidential files.1
7
The court ordered delivery of the reports to the trial judge primarily on
grounds that transfer of the documents to the Army removed them from the
protection of that regulation, which applied only to Justice Department
employees directed to produce documents in court. Going beyond the
tion which could have been suppressed had the suit never been brought. Fleming v.
Bernardi, 1 F.R.D. 624, 625 (N.D.Ohio 1941) (". . [W]hen a party seeks relief in a
court of law, he must be held to have waived any privilege, which he otherwise might have
had, to withhold testimony required by the rules of pleading or evidence as a basis for
such relief.') ; accord: United States v. Beeknan, 155 F2d 5'M (2d Cir. 1946) ; United
States v. Andolschek, 142 F2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944). But the vaiver theory is not applied
with uniformity. Obviously, for instance, it is disregarded where discovery is denied even
though the Government has brought the suit. See note 13 infra.
13. United States v. Cohen, 148 F2d 94 (2d Cir. 1945) (in criminal prosecution for
conspiracy to violate the Selective Training and Service Act, the notes of an FBI agent
held privileged); United States v. Ebeling, 146 F2d 254 (2d Cir. 1944) (in criminal
prosecution, report to FBI made by Government witness held privileged).
14. In re Hirsch, 74 Fed. 928 (C.C.Conn. 1896) (in a state prosecution for the main-
tenance of an establishment for dispensing intoxicating liquors, the internal revenue col-
lector could not refuse to produce defendant's federal tax return); Parsons v. State,
38 So2d 209 (1948) (in state criminal prosecution, trial court should request Attorney
General of the United States to produce articles which are deemed necessary for a fair
trial).
Although these cases were state criminal prosecutions, they were "private" suits inso-
far as the United States was concerned. In both cases discovery was ordered even though
the United States had not been a party to the suit.
15. 74 F.Supp. 933 (D.Haw. 1947).
16. Plaintiff was imprisoned, with only a perfunctory hearing, by order of the Gover-
nor immediately after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. See Ex tarle Zimmerman,
132 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1942), in which habeas corpus was denied.
17. 11 FED. REG. 177A-107, Subparagraph E, § 51.71, promulgated under authority of
Rav. STAT. § 161 (1789), 5 U.S.C. §22 (1946). See note 19 iufra. The leading case pro-
tecting documents against disclosure under this regulation is Ex parto Sackett, 74 F2d 922
(9th Cir. 1935).
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primary holding, the court also indicated that denial of the privilege was
consistent with the "public-private" test. 18
Implicit in the primary basis of the decision is the assumption, perhaps
arguendo, that the regulation, if applicable, would have created a statutory
privilege. The assumption was at least convenient in that it allowed the
court to avoid a difficult question: the existence of a statutory privilege is
far from clear. The statutory authority for promulgation of the regulation
merely empowers the Attorney General to make rules, not inconsistent with
existing law, for the custody and disposition of documents within his con-
trol.' 9 Pursuant to this power the Attorney General might classify certain
documents as within those categories considered privileged by existing law.
But in fact this regulation attempts no such classification, and a regulation
purporting to create a blanket privilege at the discretion of the Attorney
General would appear to be "inconsistent with law" and thus invalid as
beyond the scope of the statute. 20 Rather than authorizing a department
head to create an all-encompassing privilege, the statute's function is to
insure that he can offer his objection in court before the judiciary rules on
the existence of a privilege. 2' Thus, even if only by a refusal to disclose, the
opinion of a fully informed official on the treatment of important govern-
mental papers is to be made available to the court.22
18. "But we think from a broader viewpoint, as well, the position of the Department of
Justice ... is untenable. This case is not one involving the authority of a State court
over Federal officers, nor is the action before the court purely a private one." Zimmerman
v. Poindexter, 74 F.Supp. 933, 936 (D.Haw. 1947).
19. "The head of each department is authorized to prescribe regulations, not incon-
sistent with law, for the government of his department, the conduct of its officers and
clerks, the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preserva-
tion of the records, papers, and property appertaining to it." REV. STAT. § 161 (1789), 5
U.S.C. § 22 (1946).
20. See 8 WGmom, EVIDENCE 795 (3d ed. 1940).
21. The reason for the promulgation of the regulation is the fear that subordinates
would expose information at the court's request without realizing that it might be con-
fidential. Application of the regulation in earlier cases does not indicate that the courts
attributed to it any further meaning or power. In Fowkes v. Dravo Corp., 5 F.R.D. 51
(E.D.Pa. 1945), for example, discovery from a subordinate Treasury Department official
was not granted. Instead the court directed the plaintiff first to make application to tie
Secretary of the Treasury prior to seeking disclosure in the courts. "[W]here the public
interest requires that the information and documents be kept undisclosed, that interest
ought not to be encroached upon, and the Secretary of the Treasury, in whom the custody
of the matters sought herein is reposed, should be permitted the opportunity of making tile
initial decision." Id. at 53. Accord, Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900)..
In the instant case the Attorney General had already offered his objections, and the
applicability of the rule requiring employees to clear with the Attorney General seems to
have little relevance.
22. The subpoena duces tecum is issued typically to the subordinate employee who is
the actual custodian of the documents. He then appears in court and states that the regu-
lation precludes compliance with the subpoena without the consent of the department head.
The court may then discuss the matter with the executive official in chambers in order to
arrive at a solution satisfactory to all parties. But at no point could disclosure be re-
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But regardless of whether or not the regulation validly created a privilege,
a denial of the regulation's applicability would not logically dispose of the
issue in the Zimmernzan case: the question of the existence of a common law
privilege would still remain. The court's assumption that on broader grounds
the privilege was barred by the "public-private" test, since federally pro-
tected rights were iiivolved and United States attorneys appeared on the
defendant's behalf, might indicate that the common law privilege was con-
sidered and denied. Literally interpreted, however, the opinion seems to
indicate a misconceived effort to superimpose the "public-private" test
on the alleged privilege under the regulation.
If indeed the court did deny the privilege only after considering the
common law grounds, the opinion underscores the artificiality of the test
as a rationalization of a decision probably reached on grounds of the par-
ticular equities present. Never before has the federal nature of the individ-
ual rights been thought sufficient to remove a suit between private parties
into the "public" category for purposes of the claimed privilege.23 If it
were, the existence of a "federal right" might be found in many private suits.
Nor has discovery been allowed in cases between private parties merely
because United States attorneys represented one of the parties.2 4 Their
presence does not indicate the Government's legal interest in the outcome:
here, for example, the Government was not liable if the defendants lost.
Actually, the "public-private" test was here distorted to fit the desired
result, and the factors involved in the underlying balance of needs were
left unmentioned.
Unrelated though it is to the basic determinants of the privilege, the
"public-private" dichotomy is at least related to the enforcement problems
involved in discovery. In this context, it has some practical basis. In
criminal proceedings, and civil actions in which the Government is plaintiff,
a court ordering disclosure can indirectly force compliance with its subpoena
by dismissing an indictment or complaint on grounds that refusal to dis-
close so prejudiced the defendant as to preclude a fair trial..2 1 Short of this
sanction, a court could refuse to admit Government evidence which the
quired even to the judge, and a subpoena directed at the department executive vould un-
doubtedly not be enforced. See note 25 infra. This undoubtedly accounts for the absence
of precedents in which the question of disclosure has reached a point of open conflict be-
tween a court and an executive official.
23. Fowkes v. Dravo Corp., 5 F.R.D. 51 (E.D.Pa. 1945) and Shallow v. Marl:ert
Alfg. Co., 175 Misc. 613, 24 N.Y.S2d 823 (Sup. Ct. 1941), for example, involved rights
under a federal statute but were treated as "private suits."
24. E.g., Fowkes v. Dravo, 5 F.RLD. 51 (E.D.Pa. 1945).
25. See, e.g., Parsons v. State, 3S So.2d 209 (1948). The court stated that the
judiciary had the burden of securing a fair trial and should the Attorney General fail
to produce certain articles, an appellate court could decide whether a trial without the
articles would be consistent with the requirements of due process. In United States v.
Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944), a new trial was ordered partly because the
court could not sanction a ". . . prosecution of a crime consisting of the very matters re-
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undisclosed documents might tend to refute. 2 But where private litigants
alone are involved, a court, in the last analysis, has no direct or indirect
means of enforcing a subpoena against a Government officer in his official
capacity. The doctrine of separation of powers would seem to bar contempt
proceedings against executive department personnel, and, while no cases
are squarely in point, courts have apparently recognized this barrier in
dicta. 27 The indirect sanctions useful in "public" suits are not generally
available, since a private litigant should not be penalized for the Govern-
ment's refusal to disclose. A court's enforcement authority in private suits
consists primarily in its ability to issue the subpoena and the natural re-
luctance of a Government official to disobey.
While the unavailability of sanctions to enforce a subpoena may perhaps
explain the "public-private" test, the explanation does not justify use of
the test within the area where the courts, as a practical matter, can effec-
tively direct a disclosure. Recognition or rejection of the privilege should
be made on an ad hoc basis, with the decision openly reached by balancing
the relative harm to the public occasioned by disclosure against the in-
fringement of individual rights flowing from secrecy. 2 Since the executive
official apparently has the hltimate control over disclosure under any rule,
there is no need to fear that discard of the mechanical standard which con-
fused the Zimmerman case would ever endanger national security.
corded in the suppressed document. . . ." This left the choice with the Government of
introducing the suppressed evidence or dropping the charges. In Fleming v. Bernardi, 1
F.R.D. 624, 626 (N.D.Ohio 1941) the court stated that the Government ". . . must either
give up [its] privilege to withhold pertinent evidence or . . . must abandon [its] sult for
relief."
26. See United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1944): "..I. []n any
event it must be a condition upon the continuance of any such privilege that the prosecu-
tion-its possessor-shall not adduce testimony touching the subject matter communicated."
27. No attempt has ever been made to cite the head of an executive department for
contempt for failure" to obey a court order to produce documents. See Jacoby v. Delfiner,
183 Misc. 280, 281, 51 N.Y.S.2d 478, 479 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (". . . (A]n order of the court
directing the United States Department of Justice to furnish plaintiffs with the information
desired need not be honored by that Federal agency and, accordingly, the order sought
herein would be a mere futility."). Professor Moore states that it is "not clear" whether
such a suit, if brought, would be successful. 2 Mooan's FEDMRAL PRAmcErc 2642 (1st ed.
1938). And no court has even suggested that a contempt action against a department head
could be maintained. Although the court in the Zimmerman case ordered an Army officer
to turn over certain documents, the problems of possible non-compliance were not reached.
28. The comparative equities in the Zimmerman case probably led the court to its de-
cision. The action taken by the Government in imprisoning the plaintiff undoubtedli
militated against suppression of any information which might help him clear his name, In
that respect Zimmerman was in a position analogous to a defendant in a criminal prosecu-
tion who seeks information to defeat the charges against him. E.g., United States v.
Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944). Imprisonment of the plaintiff without a fair
hearing is as serious an invasion of his freedom as the commencement of a criminal prose-
cution and more of an invasion than a petition for injunction for violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. See, e.g., Fleming v. Berdnardi, 1 F.R.D. 624 (N.D.Ohio 1941).
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